



   
 
How to distinguish long-term individual memory representations? A 
historical and critical journey 
 
Como distinguir representações de memória individuais de longo prazo? Uma 




Abstract: Memory is not a unitary phenomenon. Even among the group of long-term 
individual memory representations (known in the literature as declarative memory) there 
seems to be a distinction between two kinds of memory: memory of personally experienced 
events (episodic memory) and memory of facts or knowledge about the world (semantic 
memory). Although this distinction seems very intuitive, it is not so clear in which 
characteristic or set of interrelated characteristics lies the difference. In this article, I 
present the different criteria proposed in the philosophical and scientific literature in 
order to account for this distinction: (1) the vehicle of representation; (2) the grammar of 
the verb “to remember”; (3) the cause of the memory; (4) the memory content; and (5) the 
phenomenology of memory representations. Whereas some criteria seem more plausible 
than others, I show that all of them are problematic and none of them really fulfill their 
aim. I then briefly outline a different criterion, the affective criterion, which seems a 
promising line of research to try to understand the grounds of this distinction. 
Keywords: Kinds of memory; Declarative memory; Episodic memory; Semantic memory; 
Autobiographical memory 
 
Resumo: A memória não é um fenômeno unitário. Mesmo entre o grupo de representações 
de memória individuais de longo prazo (conhecidas na literatura como memória 
declarativa), parece haver uma distinção entre dois tipos de memória: memória de eventos 
experimentados pessoalmente (memória episódica) e memória de fatos ou conhecimentos 
sobre o mundo (memória semântica). Embora essa distinção pareça muito intuitiva, não é 
tão claro em qual característica ou conjunto de características inter-relacionadas reside a 
diferença. Neste artigo, apresento os diferentes critérios propostos na literatura filosófica e 
científica para dar conta dessa distinção: (1) o veículo de representação; (2) a gramática do 
verbo “lembrar”; (3) a causa da memória; (4) o conteúdo da memória; e (5) a fenomenologia 
das representações da memória. Embora alguns critérios pareçam mais plausíveis que 
outros, mostro que todos são problemáticos e nenhum deles realmente cumpre seu 
objetivo. Em seguida, descrevo brevemente um critério diferente, o critério afetivo, que 
parece uma linha de pesquisa promissora para tentar entender os fundamentos dessa 
distinção. 
Palavras-chave: Tipos de memória; Memória declarativa; Memória episódica; Memória 
semântica; Memória autobiográfica 
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Nowadays, it is a quite accepted fact that all phenomena that are in general labeled 
as memory cases are in fact extremely heterogeneous. Memory is more an umbrella term 
than a unitary phenomenon. Individual memories have been distinguished from group or 
collective memories (some authors have even denied that collective memory is a real 
memory phenomenon); long-term memories have been also distinguished from short-term 
memories, and procedural memories from declarative memories (habits and motor skills). 
Even inside this last group, which refer to long-term individual memories representations 
that inform action and decision making, a famous distinction has been introduced in the 
literature a couple of decades ago: memory of experiences—called in general episodic 
memory—has been opposed to memory of facts—semantic memory—which actually refers 
to general knowledge about the world. This distinction, outlined first in philosophy and 
supported by empirical evidence since the 70’s, is in fact quite intuitive. Memories of 
objective and depersonalized information that we have acquired indirectly, through 
testimonial sources, such as remembering that the capital of the province of Buenos Aires 
is La Plata, do not seem comparable to the memory of first-hand personal experiences that 
are colored with subjectivity. Many of these personal memories present a phenomenal 
richness that impersonal and semantic memories lack, such as a high degree of affect and 
the presence of visual images. On the other hand, sometimes this dissimilarity shrinks: 
some personal experiences are so distant in time that one remembers them devoid of all 
subjectivity, as if they were factual knowledge and did not imply any feeling of reliving or 
traveling back in time. Sometimes we remember specific moments of our lives that are 
very vivid, but other times, all that is left from a period of our life is a general impression 
and we are unable to retrieve any specific event. Sometimes we remember through 
language, and other times visual images of past events pop into our minds, even when we 
remember general knowledge about the world. 
The reason for distinguishing different categories is—if not to identify natural 
kinds—at least to make distinctions that are conceptually or empirically useful in order to 
think about and analyze mental phenomena. As Boyd1 and Machery2 have pointed out, 
entities should be clustered together when they share a large set of properties because of 
some uniform causal mechanism and when these clusters optimize the inductive and 
explanatory purposes of theories that make reference to them. Although there seems to be 
an essential difference between memories of experiences and memory of facts in order to 
justify the distinction in terms of different (natural) kinds, it is not so clear in which 
characteristic or set of interrelated characteristics lies this difference. If the difference lies 
in the content, the notions of “experience” and “fact” would need further specification. But 
the distinction could also be justified through other main characteristic, such as their 
 
1 BOYD, Homeostasis, species and higher taxa.  
2 MACHERY, Doing Without Concepts. 
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vehicles of representation, their causes, or their different phenomenology.  Even if the 
difference in kind is grounded in the existence of distinct memory systems, different 
characteristics at the personal level must supervene from these different neural 
realizations. So the problem of identifying the property or interrelation of properties that 
establish a distinction between different kinds of long-term individual memory 
representations still persists. 
Through history, philosophers and cognitive scientists have proposed different 
criteria to account for this intuitive distinction between memories of experiences and 
memories of facts. In some cases, the criterion proposed leads to make further distinctions 
between long-term individual memory representations. In this article, my aim is thus to 
present the different criteria that have been proposed in the literature to distinguish 
different kinds of long-term individual memory representations, and evaluate if they 
successfully fulfill their aim. I distinguish five types of criteria according to (1) the vehicle 
of representation; (2) the grammar of the verb “to remember”; (3) the cause of the memory; 
(4) the memory content; and (5) the phenomenology of memory representations. As this 
analysis shows, whereas some criteria are more plausible than others from a theoretical 
and experimental perspective, none of them is exempt of problems. The major 
inconvenient seems to be focused on a poor analysis of the interaction and correlation 
between different significant properties of our memory experiences. At the end of this 
article, in section (6), I briefly outline a different criterion, the affective criterion, which is 
promising for accounting for this correlation and may thus in the future, with further 
research, prove to be more successful than the others to elucidate the diversity of our long-
term individual memory representations. 
One important remark: as I have already suggested, this analysis is confined to 
long-term individual memory representations and thus, excludes criteria that contrast 
these memory representations with something else, such as short-term representations, 
procedures, habits and motor skills, or collective memories. Therefore, the aim of this 
work is to set out and critically analyze the variety of criteria present in the literature to 
distinguish different kinds of long-term individual memory representations. 
 
The grammatical criterion 
 
The grammatical criterion—a criterion based on the grammar of the verb “to 
remember”—is in certain way the most superficial criterion to distinguish different long-
term individual memory representations. The distinction between different kinds of 
memories according to the grammatical objects of the verb to remember has its origins in 
the distinction between memories of facts and memories of experiences that was object of 
philosophical debate during the 60’s and 70’s. 
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Factual memory is unanimously considered to refer to memories whose natural 
expression involves a clause of the form “remember that p” where p stands for a 
proposition which has the property of being true or false3. But factual memory, according 
to the grammatical distinction, is not limited to general knowledge, such as “I remember 
that Paris is the capital of France”. It can also refer to personal events. When it refers to 
personal events, it would be the equivalent of remembering not the past experience, but 
that something personally experienced occurred or existed, as in the following example: “I 
remember that I went with my family to Barcelona for the Easter holidays”. Event memory, 
on the contrary, which has also been named “personal memory” or “experiential memory”, 
is characterized by the gerundival construction in -ing: I remember verb + -ing4, as in “I 
remember reading your book” or “I remember the sun going down over the Indian Ocean”. 
Other authors consider that nominalizations of verbs are also possible objects of event 
memories, as in “I remember the hike through the Berkshires”5.  
This is the most common way in which grammar has been used as a criterion to 
distinguish two different kinds of memory. Nonetheless, more recently, Bernecker6 
broadened and reformulated this dual distinction in order to add new memory categories. 
According to his grammatical taxonomy, propositional memory refers to “any ‘substituent’ 
of the schema ‘S remembers that p’, irrespective of whether ‘p’ refers to something one has 
personally experienced”7 or not. In addition, propositional memory can also take the form 
of “wh-clauses”, such as “I remember ‘who’, ‘whom’, ‘what’, ‘where’, ‘when’ or ‘why’”. 
These cases of extroversive propositional memories contrast with cases of introversive 
propositional memories, which refer to one’s own mental states, are necessarily in the 
first-person mode and contain a second-order subordinated proposition with a verb in a 
past tense: “I remember that I [remembered, thought, believed, inferred, etc.] that p”. Non-
propositional memory, on the other hand, not only refers to event-memory (I remember 
verb + ing), but also to object-memory (I remember + noun) and property-memory (I 
remember + noun + of noun). To conclude, in Bernecker’s taxonomy the grammatical 
criterion is completely detached and independent of the content one: it is the sole 
syntactic form that determines the nature of a memory. 
Nonetheless, the grammatical criterion does not constitute a good criterion to 
distinguish memory kinds because it merely provides just that: a grammatical distinction, 
while pretending to provide something more than a grammatical distinction, such as a 
distinction of psychological memory kinds. First, the grammatical criterion on one hand 
divides memories that seem to have more properties in common and could be explained by 
 
3 MALCOLM, Knowledge and Certainty. BERNECKER, Memory: A philosophical Study. 
4 WOLLHEIM, The Thread of Life. BERNECKER, Memory: A philosophical Study. 
5 MALCOLM, Knowledge and Certainty, p. 215.  
6 BERNECKER, The Metaphysics of Memory; Memory: A philosophical Study. 
7 BERNECKER, Memory: A philosophical Study, p. 20. 
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the same causal mechanism, such as “I remember that I read your book” and “I remember 
reading your book”, both of which refer to a past event experienced by the rememberer, 
and on the other hand clusters together memories that do not share many properties, such 
as “I remember that I read your book” (that + event experienced) and “I remember that 
Paris is the capital of France” (that + fact or semantic knowledge). This suggests that the 
grammatical criterion is exclusively based on syntax and does not even consider semantics, 
which would be essential to the understanding of memory, even from a grammatical point 
of view. Second, this syntactic distinction is not even a good syntactic distinction: it is 
exclusively based on the analysis of English and does not consider the fact that some other 
languages, such as Japanese, do not have the same kind of gerundival constructions8. But 
the essential problem is that the grammatical criterion is intended to be more than just a 
syntactic and semantic distinction; it presumes to assert a difference at the psychological 
level, in the sense that it aims to explain different ways in which we can remember and not 
different syntactic constructions of the verb “to remember”. Maybe the grammatical 
criterion was thought by some authors as a simple way of using different terms to express 
different kinds of memories based on another criterion, such as the content criterion. 
“Remembering that p” would express memories of facts or knowledge whereas 
“remembering + ing”, memory of experiences. If it is the case, the grammatical distinction 
should get stuck to its origins and be simply used as a way of naming different memories 
in English, but it should not be considered as an independent criterion to distinguish 
different kinds of memories. 
 
 The vehicle criterion 
 
By vehicle, I refer to the more known notion of vehicle of representation or mean of 
representation in opposition to the notion of representational content. The vehicle 
criterion is the oldest criterion to distinguish between different memory kinds that can be 
found in the literature. Although there are some references to this distinction in Plato’s 
writings, it is Aristotle who first made it explicit in De Memoria et reminiscentia. In this 
text, Aristotle distinguishes between memory (mneme) and recollection (anamnesis). 
Aristotle considers that memory has a particular affinity with imagination (phantasmata). 
Memory is an affection (pathos), and imprinted trace, and thus refers to the capacity of 
“having” images that correspond to previous sense perception, knowledge or judgment. 
Recollection, on the other hand, is an organized search, and thus, it presupposes an orderly 
method, usually called association of ideas: the rememberer has to move through a series 
of images that follow an order in a particular succession. It may be interpreted that for 
Aristotle “memory is nonpropositional and is similar to scenic memory”, whereas 
 
8 For a detailed analysis of the language of memory see: AMBERBER, The Language of Memory in a 
Crosslinguistic Perspective. 
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“recollection is propositional and is similar to narrative memory”9. Although Aristotle’s 
distinction between two kinds of memory: mneme and anamnesis, is not solely built on the 
mean of representation, but also in the underlying processes: passive versus active, 
involuntary versus voluntary, it is generally taken as an example of a distinction based on 
the vehicles of representation especially because of its influence during the Antiquity and 
the Middle Ages. Cicero, Plotinus, Augustine, Avicenna, Averroes, Albert the Great, 
Thomas Aquinas, mostly all philosophers after Aristotle adopted the dichotomy between a 
sensible memory that would be a kind of mental picture that reduplicates in the mind past 
perceptual and sensory experiences, and an intellectual memory, a recollection of ideas 
that is presented discursively as an argument or speech. 
This first distinction between visual memories and propositional memories does 
not really parallel the intuitive distinction between memory of experiences and memory of 
events. Nonetheless, someone could think that memories of experiences are imagistic and 
memories of facts are propositional. Michaelian10 does not propose a specific account on 
the topic, but mentions in his book11 that semantic memories have propositional content, 
whereas episodic memories consist primarily of imagistic content (although it may also 
include propositional content). Whereas visual and spatial imagistic contents may be 
considered to be essential to episodic memory—such as Rubin12 has defended—, spatial 
and visual imagery is certainly not sufficient to distinguish episodic from semantic 
memory. Semantic knowledge or memories of impersonal information of the world, such 
as “The Amazon is currently burning at a record rate”, can also been retrieved through 
more than just propositional vehicles: they can be constructed from different pieces of 
information that come in different formats. For example, this memory can come with 
visual images of the forest burning I saw on TV, of a map of Brazil or South America, etc. 
The emotion system can also intervene in the retrieval of semantic memories: I can 
remember the current Amazon rainforest fires with rage or sadness (although in this case 
these emotions are not really part of the memory but show the way these memories are 
appraised). On the other hand, although impairments of visual imagery have been 
associated with amnesia13, visual and spatial imagery may not be really necessary to 
episodically remember: blind people certainly remember, mainly through auditory imagery 
and narrative forms14. In conclusion, episodic memories probably present a richer imagery 
than semantic ones, but the presence of mental images, or of any other vehicle of 
representation, is not in itself sufficient to make a distinction between different kinds of 
 
9 NIKULIN, Memory in Ancient Philosophy, p. 69. 
10 MICHAELIAN, Mental Time Travel: episodic memory and our knowledge of the personal past. 
11 Idem, p. 35, p. 53. 
12 RUBIN, Event memory: A theory of memory for laboratory, autobiographical and fictional events. 
13 GREENBERG; RUBIN, The neuropsychology of autobiographical memory. 
14 TEKCAN et al., Retrieval and phenomenology of autobiographical memories in blind individuals. 
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long-term individual memory representations, and may not even be necessary to 
characterize the particularity of one kind of memory representation such as memory of 
events personally experienced. 
In fact, many authors have proposed that there is a single vehicle for all long-term 
individual memory representations, such as Bartlett15 and Russell16, who considered that 
genuine and pure memories are pictures of past occurrences, that is, memory-images. But 
more recently conceptualizations of episodic memory have highlighted quite the opposite 
characteristic: episodic memory is constructed from information carried by different 
vehicles. Probably the first proponent of this conception was Paivio, who in the 1970’s 
reintroduced the notion of images as a particular kind of representation different from the 
linguistic one. He postulated the dual code theory of memory, which considers that visual 
and verbal information are encoded in two systems that interact but are functionally 
independent17. Rubin18 also proposed a multimodal and multi-system model of episodic 
memory. According to his model, different aspects of episodic memories are stored not in 
an abstract format but in different systems, that is why episodic memories are always 
formed by the mutual coordination of independent systems. These basic systems are 
independent because each one uses different structures and processes for fundamentally 
different kinds of information. Each one has also its own functions, neural substrates and 
types of errors that affect memory. These basic memory systems that provide different 
kinds of information are generally coordinated by the explicit memory system and the 
search and retrieval system, both of which are considered as the behavioral and neural 
basis of episodic memory. So according to Rubin, the main system of episodic memory 
does not encode specific information but coordinates information coming from systems 
that are not memory-specific. Concerning these basic systems that are not memory-
specific, Rubin distinguishes different sensory systems, the language and narrative 
systems and the emotion system. In relation to the sensory systems, he considers that each 
one provides different kinds of information to the episodic memory: “different senses 
process information about different properties of the environment (e.g. electromagnetic 
radiation, vibration, pressure, chemicals that contact the sensory surface), using different 
transducer mechanisms and neural networks that have different short- and long-term 
relevance to different aspects of the individual’s behavior”19. Visual, spatial, olfactory, 
auditory, gustatory and tactile forms of imagery not only rely at the subpersonal level on 
different systems but also present specific properties and characteristics at the personal 
level that make them different from each other as well as from other different kinds of 
 
15 BARTLETT, Remembering. 
16 RUSSELL, The Problems of Philosophy. 
17 PAIVIO, Mental Representations. 
18 RUBIN, The basic-systems model of episodic memory. 
19 Idem, p. 282.  
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representations, like linguistic ones. In fact, according to Rubin empirical studies are 
consistent with the idea that visual and multimodal objects and scenes are stored both in 
the original sensory systems and in the language system, more specifically, in the language 
that has been used at the time of the event20. 
Nonetheless, the idea that memories are constructed from different bits of 
information coming from different systems does not entail that the sources of these 
different kinds of information are exclusively memory systems. As a matter of fact, these 
different bits of information not only contribute to the construction of memories but also 
to the construction of imaginative scenarios and fictitious experiences, and the simulation 
of future episodes. Consider the visual and spatial system. Research has shown that the 
generation, maintenance, and visualization of complex spatial contexts, that is, the process 
of scene construction, is a common process underlying episodic memory and 
imagination21. Patients with long-term visual memory loss cannot draw objects or describe 
property objects from memory or have a visual image of objects upon introspection22. But 
like blind people, they can certainly remember experiences from their past, as well as other 
impersonal information about the world, in a linguistic or other kind of sensory form. 
Therefore, these bits of visual and spatial information that have been encoded in the visual 
and spatial system are not per se different kinds of memories but just different kinds of 
information that contribute to the construction of different kinds of mental states, such as 
memories, fictional imaginings, future self-projection, navigation, etc. The same could be 
said about the other systems, such as the emotion system, which can also intervene in 
current perceptions, perceptions of fiction (watching a movie, reading a novel), 
imaginings, future simulation, memories, just to give some examples. 
In conclusion, the vehicle criterion does not constitute a good criterion neither to 
characterize memory nor to distinguish different memory kinds. If the vehicle criterion 
was employed as a criterion to distinguish different kinds of memories, it would be too 
broad and inclusive and would not only include other mental states and experiences that 
are not past-oriented and have a completely different nature (imaginings, simulations, 
perceptions, etc.), but would not even do its job of distinguishing different long-term 
individual memory representations. That is why it is better to consider the vehicle 
criterion as a criterion to distinguish different kinds of information that are used by 
different mental capacities, such as imagination, future projection, navigation, etc., as well 
as in the construction of different kinds of memories, such as memories of episodes 
personally experienced in the past and memories of impersonal information about the 
world. 
 
20 SCHRAUF, Bilingual autobiographical memory: Experimental studies and clinical cases. MARIAN; 
NEISSER, Language-dependent recall of autobiographical memories. 
21 HASSABIS et al., Using imagination to understand the neural basis of episodic memory. 
22 FARAH, The neurological basis of mental imagery: A componential analysis. 
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The causal criterion 
 
The causal criterion to distinguish memories is based on the previous condition 
that is necessary to remember a past event, and also appears in relation to the 
philosophical distinction between memory of facts and memory of events, as I show below. 
Although the causal criterion may be at first sight associated to the causal theory of 
memory, the major proponents of this theory23 did not use it to establish a distinction 
between different kinds of long-term individual memory representations. Bernecker 
adopted a grammatical criterion to make distinctions and applied the causal theory to all 
cases of propositional memory. Concerning Martin & Deutscher, while at the beginning of 
their seminal paper, they suggest that there are memories that require a previous 
experience of what is remembered and other that do not, they finally analyzed both of 
them within the same causal framework. In fact, a memory of some information gained 
through testimony does not imply a direct experience of the event remembered but it does 
imply a previous (and direct) experience of learning about that event through visual or 
auditory perception. Because the causal condition comprehends memory of events, general 
knowledge, and even procedural memories24, it is not useful per se to establish distinctions 
between different kinds of memories. 
This conclusion can be questioned if memories are produced by causes that are 
different in nature. Different causes produce in principle different memory phenomena. 
Some authors have proposed that memory of events only requires as a previous condition 
that the remembered event is based on a previous experience or perception of that event, 
whereas knowledge or factual memory requires that the present knowledge or belief about 
a past event is based on a past knowledge or belief. The introduction of the notions of 
“knowledge” and “belief” refines the characterization of the kind of “experience” that is 
necessary to remember events learnt through testimonial sources (understood in a broad 
sense) in opposition to events that have been directly experienced by the rememberer 
(realization, participation or direct perception). Malcolm25 is an advocate of the strong 
sense of this criterion. He defines event memory or personal memory in the following 
terms: “A person B personally remembers something, x, if and only if B previously 
perceived or experienced x and B’s memory of x is based wholly or partly on his previous 
perception or experience of x”26, whereas factual memory is defined as “A person B 
remembers that p if and only if B knows that p because he knew that p”27. Fernandez28, on 
 
23 MARTIN; DEUTSCHER, Remembering. BERNECKER, Memory: A Philosophical Study. 
24 MICHAELIAN, Opening the doors of memory: is declarative memory a natural kind? 
25 MALCOLM, Knowledge and Certainty.  
26 Idem, p. 215.  
27 Idem, p. 223 
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the other hand, defends a weaker version: whereas factual memory of the proposition p 
requires previous belief that p, event memory of p is possible even if the rememberer had 
never believed that p before. Despite this distinction, Malcolm29 for example has admitted 
the existence of some relation between these two kinds of memories. According to him, 
personal memory entails a factual memory version of itself: “A person who personally 
remembers the burning of the city hall could be said, in this derivative sense, to personally 
remember that it burned”30. He named this memory personal factual memory in opposition 
to non-personal factual memory. Here we have two possible interpretations: either 
Malcolm considers that when we lose the capacity to bring back details of a past 
experience the personal memory becomes a factual memory, or he believes that while 
experiencing an event we always gain and form some knowledge, which is in certain way 
encoded independently of the experience itself and can be later recalled in the form of 
personal facts. 
In any case, the causal criterion implies epistemological assumptions about the way 
in which our memories are justified: factual memories always require a prior belief, if not 
knowledge. This thesis corresponds to the epistemic theory of memory. I will nonetheless 
avoid a deep analysis of the epistemic theory of memory and just focus on the two 
formulations mentioned earlier. For my purposes the only question that matters is if the 
criterion is useful to distinguish between different kinds of long-term individual memory 
representations. It has been criticized31 that factual memory is an umbrella category that 
includes two different kinds of memories, i.e. memory of events personally experienced 
and memory of events learned through testimony32. This criticism could be overcome if we 
take into consideration the distinction made by Malcolm between personal and non-
personal factual memories. Nonetheless, this distinction would cluster together factual 
memory and personal factual memories, which are memories that have little in common 
except the fact of being caused by a past belief / knowledge, and would divide personal 
memories in two different kinds for the only reason of being produced or not by a past 
belief / knowledge. Furthermore, the most important criticism points to the fact that a 
previous belief or knowledge is neither sufficient nor necessary for having a factual 
memory. First, remembering—even factually remembering—cannot be equated with 
knowing that or believing that. Cases of relearning, in which a subject knows or believes 
that p at time t1, then forgets p at time t2, and then relearns p again at time t3, prove that 
 
28 FERNANDEZ, The Intentionality of Memory.  
29 MALCOLM, Knowledge and Certainty. 
30 Idem, p. 216. 
31 MUNSAT, The Concept of Memory. SAUNDERS, Does all memory imply factual memory?. NAYLOR, 
Remembering-that: episodic vs. semantic. 
32 MUNSAT, The Concept of Memory. 
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someone can know or believe that p without for that remembering that p33. This example 
shows that previous knowledge or belief is not sufficient for factual memory and that 
factual memory cannot be equated to present belief or knowledge. Secondly, previous 
knowledge and belief are not even necessary to remember something. Cases of inattentive 
remembering, that is, when we are inattentive and do not form a conscious belief while 
experiencing the event but we form it later while remembering the event34, or cases when 
we do not consciously form a belief about p but then a defeater of p is removed and thus 
we remember p35, or negative memories, like remembering not having done something, are 
common counterexamples that have been used in the literature to argue that past 
knowledge and beliefs need not be a necessary requirement to remember beliefs or past 
experiences36. Therefore, previous knowledge or belief cannot be a criterion to identify 
different kinds of memory: not all current beliefs and knowledge are memories, and 
memories do not require previous knowledge and beliefs.   
In consequence, it seems that the causal criterion that distinguishes different kinds 
of memory in function of their cause: previous perception/first-hand experience for event 
memory versus previous knowledge37 or previous belief38 for factual memory, does not 
really constitute a good criterion to discriminate what it pretends to discern: memory of 
personal experiences and memories of information acquired through testimony. 
However, there is another possibility to establish different kinds of memories based 
on the cause. Instead of focusing on the distal cause of memories, a distinction can be 
made in relation to their proximate cause: the memory trace. Memories of events 
personally experienced could be caused by different memory traces than factual memories. 
This is the proposal done by Chen & al. who consider that the episodic memory trace is 
one of the key elements that enables the construction of episodic memories. Episodic 
memory traces refer to information stored in the brain about the gist of one specific 
experienced event, and contrasts with traces that refer to information of “multiple, 
personally experienced or not, episodes (semantic information)”39. Nonetheless, Chen & al. 
admits that through repeated reactivation in the construction of episodic memories, 
episodic traces can in certain way become semantic40, and they even acknowledge that 
“there may be no clear line that divides episodic memory traces from semantic 
information, since some cases cannot be easily recognized as either one or the other, 
 
33 MARGOLIS, Remembering. MUNSAT, The Concept of Memory. 
34 LACKEY, Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source. 
35 NAYLOR, Remembering-that: episodic vs. semantic. 
36 For a general review of these arguments, see BERNECKER, Memory: A Philosophical Study. 
37 MALCOLM, Knowledge and Certainty. 
38 FERNANDEZ, The Intentionality of Memory. 
39 CHEN et al., Dissociating memory traces and scenario construction in mental time travel, p. 8. 
40 Idem, p. 12.  
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leaving the possibility that the two are different by degree rather than by kind”41. Chen & 
al.’s model of episodic memory is more complex than that (it is not only based on a 
memory trace), and a real criticism lies outside the scope of this article. But it is worth it to 
mention that an episodic memory trace is not sufficient to make a distinction between 
different kinds of memories. As I will better develop on the section about the content 
criterion, first, it is not clear how specific must be the event from which the episodic 
memory trace derives. And second, in some cases semantic information can be tied to a 
memory trace of a quite specific and single episode, such as when I remember an event I 
have not first-hand experienced but that I have recently heard about on the news. I can 
even forget the context in which I learnt that information, without this implying that the 
memory retrieved is not caused by a single and near-experience memory trace. Acquisition 
of semantic information may depend on the acquisition of the episode of which they are a 
part42, and thus episodic memory traces may also be involved in the retrieval of semantic 
information about the world. 
Tulving’s serial-parallel-independent (SPI) model of memory also considers that 
there are different memory traces that are at the origin of different memory 
representations. According to the serial-parallel-independent model, information about an 
event is processed and encoded first in semantic memory and then in episodic memory, 
stored in parallel in both systems and retrieved independently. Unlike Chen & al., the 
difference does not reside on the level of generality of the information carried by the trace, 
but on the nature of the information encoded, which is determined by the nature of the 
original information processed and the property of the system in question43. So for Tulving 
there is no single trace or single engram for an event (even for an experience-near event), 
but “different kinds of information, representing the many different aspects of the event, 
are stored at different independent storage sites”44. For example, the semantic memory 
system can process and encode the concepts in relation with their meaning; its output 
reaches then the episodic memory system, which “computes the temporal-spatial-
contextual coordinates of the incoming information in relation to already existing episodic 
information, or to the self”45. Nonetheless, it is not really clear what are the particularities 
of each kind of information, especially of the information carried by the semantic memory 
trace. On the other hand, if the episodic memory trace refers to the temporal-spatial-
contextual information of an event, it faces significant challenges, as it will be shown in 
the following section. What is more, the SPI model has received criticism from some 
 
41 Idem, p. 9 
42 NADEL; MASCOVITCH, Memory Consolidation, Retrograde Amnesia and the Hippocampal Complex; 
SQUIRE; ZOLA, Episodic memory, semantic memory, and amnesia. 
43 TULVING, Organization of memory: Quo vadis? 
44 TULVING, Study of memory: processes and systems, p. 20.  
45 TULVING, Organization of memory: Quo vadis?, p. 844.  
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authors who questioned the idea that information can only be processed and encoded in 
episodic memory via semantic memory46. 
But independently of the more technical problems related with the SPI model, and 
more broadly with the episodic memory trace, it is possible to conceive that what causes 
different long-term individual memory representations is the existence of different 
memory systems. Memory systems are defined by Tulving as “organized structures of more 
elementary operating components. An operating component of a system consists of a 
neural substrate and its behavioral and cognitive correlates. Some components are shared 
by all systems, others are shared only by some, and still others are unique to individual 
systems”47. This means that episodic memory is an independent memory system that 
differs from other memory systems such as the semantic memory system in the 
information it processes, the laws and principles of its operations, its behavioral and 
cognitive functions but also its neural substrates and mechanisms48. The notion of multiple 
memory systems is in general widely accepted49. Although it has been questioned by 
researchers who defend the idea that episodic and semantic memory can be distinguished 
focusing on processes and not on systems50, Tulving51 has denied the existence of an 
opposition between memory systems and memory processes or mechanisms and has 
advocated for a complementarity of approaches (specially through the development of his 
SPI model). The discussion of the problems surrounding the notions of memory systems 
and memory processes are beyond the scope of this article. But the point I would like to 
highlight is that establishing different neural memory systems does not solve the problem 
of distinguishing different kinds of long-term individual memory representations: more 
needs to be said about the main operational and computational characteristics that 
accompany different neural substrates, that is, about those “components (…) that are 
unique to individual systems”. 
In fact, Tulving was not foreign to this concern: his own definition of system is not 
reduced to a neural system but encompasses different operating components. Although in 
some writings he suggested that there are a large number of characteristics that 
distinguish episodic from semantic memory without specifying which ones are the main 
ones, in other writings he suggests quite the opposite: the content of memories, and in 
later reformulations their phenomenology, are presented as the defining traits of each kind 
 
46 GRAHAM et al. Insights from semantic dementia on the relationship between episodic and semantic memory. 
47 TULVING, Memory and consciousness, p. 387. 
48 Idem. 
49 SQUIRE, Memory systems: A biological concept. 
50 E.g. BLAXTON, Investigating dissociations among memory measures. ROEDIGER; McDERMOTT, Implicit 
memory in normal human subjects. CABEZA; MOSCOVITCH, Memory systems, processing modes, and 
components. 
51 TULVING, Study of memory: processes and systems. 
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of long-term individual memory representation. In the next two sections, I explore these 
two main characteristics that, as I show, are not exempt of problems. 
 
The content criterion 
 
   The content criterion—a criterion based on the intentional object of the 
memory—is probably the more intuitive criterion to establish different long-term 
individual memory representations. This classic criterion has been widely used in 
philosophy: many philosophers from the beginning of the 20th century have distinguished 
between memory of events personally experienced (event-memory, personal memory or 
experiential memory) and memory of facts (factual memory). As it has been explained in a 
previous section, some philosophers founded this distinction on the grammar, and thus 
any memory of the form ‘I remember that p’ was considered as a factual memory. But for 
other philosophers, the difference is exclusively based on the content, that is, on the 
intentional object of the memory: whereas event-memory refers to memory of events 
personally experienced by the rememberer, factual memory refers to memory of abstract 
and impersonal information about the world that has been acquired through testimony.  
Nevertheless, it was probably in the psychological field that the distinction between 
these two kinds of memory was better characterized. Although Tulving is not the author of 
the notions of “episodic memory” and “semantic memory”, it was the first who presented 
them together as different and opposite kinds of declarative memory. 
Originally, Tulving developed the difference between the content of these two 
memories by specifying the kind of information encoded by these two different systems. 
Whereas semantic memory retains information about the meaning of words and concepts 
and their interrelations, episodic memory retains “information about temporally dated 
episodes or events and temporal-spatial relation among these events”52. So three kinds of 
information are retained in episodic memory: the what, where and when of some particular 
event that happened in the past. That is why this kind of memory has been called www 
memory by Clayton & Dickinson53. Whereas the where and when would correspond to the 
setting of an event, the what, that is, the salient happening within the setting would 
correspond to the focal element of the event54. Because it is the contextual information of 
the event which is essential to episodic memory (when semantic memory encoded 
interrelations between concepts, it also encodes the “what” of an event) this first 
characterization of episodic memory has been considered as a contextual description55. As 
McCormack explained “the general idea is that whereas factual memory simply involves 
 
52 Idem, p. 385. 
53 CLAYTON; DICKINSON, Episodic-like memory during cache recovery by scrub jays. 
54 TULVING, Elements of Episodic Memory, p. 143. 
55 McCORMACK, Attributing episodic memory to animals and children. 
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retrieval of the fact acquired during a given learning episode, the corresponding episodic 
memory would involve remembering something about the specific learning episode itself, 
namely the context in which the fact was acquired”56. If this criterion seems, in principle, 
adequate to specify the characteristics that distinguish memories of events personally 
experienced from memories of facts about the world, and it also accommodates some 
empirical data, it does not actually constitute a good criterion to distinguish different 
kinds of long-term individual memory representations. 
First, Tulving suggests that contextual information is stored with event information 
in memory but he neither explained how, nor in what consists this specific relevant 
contextual information. In fact, this last assumption presents some difficulties that have 
been expressed by McCormack57. First, we are often able to correctly recall perceptual 
properties of events without accurately recalling the temporal and contextual information. 
Second, we are able to recall temporal and contextual information of events not personally 
experienced; and finally, we are able to make temporal and contextual judgments based on 
ways different from the retrieval of stored pieces of contextual information. All these 
criticisms point to the fact that temporal and contextual information is neither necessary 
nor sufficient to define the episodic character of a memory. As McCormack wrote, “if it is 
argued that the temporal-contextual information is often not accessible for retrieval, it is 
not clear what is useful about introducing this type of information to do the job of 
ensuring the specificity of episodic memories”58. If we do not ensure the specificity of 
episodic memory, there is no possible distinction between two kinds of memory. 
Second, Tulving establishes that episodic memories are memories of occurrences of 
an episode, that is, “an event that is distinctive and separate although part of a larger 
series”59 that happens in a particular place at a particular time. It has a beginning and an 
end and the interval is filled with some action which involves the rememberer, either as an 
actor or as an observer60. This suggests that the notion of ‘event’ corresponds to a quite 
minimal and short time slice of experience and, thus for example, the memory of some 
holiday trip would be too broad to be considered as an episodic memory but will not fit 
either as a case of semantic memory which is conceived as “culturally- shared general 
knowledge (including facts and vocabulary)” and is characterized by being “detached from 
its context of acquisition and devoid of any subjective sense of mental time travel”61. This 
leaves the memories of personal general events in a sort of conceptual limbo: they do not 
 
56 Idem, p. 286. 
57 Idem, p. 293, 294.  
58 Idem, p. 295.  
59 TULVING, Episodic and semantic memory, p. 385. 
60 TULVING, Elements of Episodic Memory, p. 37. 
61 RENOULT et al. Personal semantics: at the crossroads of semantic and episodic memory, p. 550. 
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actually meet the criteria to be considered neither cases of semantic memories nor 
episodic memories. 
Finally, as I have anticipated in the section about the causal criterion, there is the 
problem of the specificity of the event of an episodic memory. The idea that the event 
remembered must be experience-near to count as an episodic memory certainly dismisses 
general and very abstract events as possible objects of episodic memories, but it does not 
clarify how much “experience-near” the event should be in order to be an object of 
episodic memory. Given that an event can always be divided into other more particular 
events, the memory of meeting someone for the first time, for example, (which can be 
decomposed into looking into each other’s eyes, saying “Hi”, shaking hands, introducing 
themselves) could be considered as too general to count as a real instance of episodic 
memory, but probably nobody would agree in denying the episodic status to this kind of 
memory. 
The concept of autobiographical memory appeared in certain way to fill up this void 
by proposing that memories of our personal past have different levels of abstraction and 
generality, are hierarchically organized in a nested structure, and are not necessarily 
episodic in nature. Because this concept proposes a richer characterization of memories of 
our personal past than the sole notion of episodic memory, it presents a solution to the 
problem of the conceptual limbo of memories of not experience-near events which is 
characteristic of Tulving’s dichotomical model, while avoiding the first problem: 
autobiographical memories are not defined in function of their location in space and time 
but according to the level of abstraction of the event remembered. 
Different computational and psychological models of autobiographical memories 
were developed from the 80’s by Kolodner62, Linton63, and Barsalou64, among others. But 
probably Conway’s65 model is the most known because of its several reformulations. 
Although each model presents its own characteristics and particularities (which I cannot 
develop here), all of them recognize the existence of different levels of abstraction of 
events that can go from those that are experience-near to those that are highly abstract 
and involve a period of our lives. That is why when remembering events of our personal 
past, the content of our memories can be a simple event: opening the car to go to the 
airport; a complex event: driving to go the airport; a general event, that includes repeated 
events: weekends at the beach, and single general events: trip to Malaysia; an extendure: 
living in the white house in Newtown; or an entire life-time period: our childhood. 
 
62 KOLODNER, Maintening organization in a dynamic long-term memory; Retrieval and Organizational Strategies 
in Conceptual Memory: A Computer Model. 
63 LINTON, Ways of searching and the contents of memory. 
64 BARSALOU, The content and organization of autobiographical memories. 
65 CONWAY, A structural model of autobiographical memory; Autobiographical knowledge and autobiographical 
memory; Memory and the self; Episodic memories. 
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Furthermore, two important principles guide most of the autobiographical memory 
conceptualizations. The first one states that generic knowledge about events and life-time 
periods is involved in the construction and representation of all memories, even of simple 
and experience-near events. That is why these memories are never a literally a record of 
experience but are always integrated with this generic and specific knowledge. It is 
Conway66 who explained with more detail the memory of simple events. A simple episodic 
memory (SEM) is composed by an episodic element (EE) and a conceptual framework. The 
episodic element corresponds to a fragmentary and summary representation of experience 
that is the result of a sensory-perceptual-conceptual-affective processing of external 
stimuli. But the episodic element is always embedded in a conceptual framework that 
contextualizes it, interprets it and thus gives to it a personal meaning. Experiences are in 
general complex and involve more than a simple episodic memory, which is why in general 
a SEM relates to other SEM in a broader frame giving rise to a complex episodic memory 
(CEM). Whereas a lot of episodic memories that we formed during the day are if not lost at 
least inaccessible, a small portion of them become integrated with autobiographical 
memory knowledge structures—general events, lifetime periods, self-knowledge, etc.—and 
this integration enables them to remain accessible in long term memory. 
The second principle, mainly highlighted by Neisser67, Barsalou68 and Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce69, considers that in everyday memories rememberers move through this 
nested structure, and so the contents of our personal memories are not stable and 
punctual, but fluctuate from simple events to more complex and abstract events and vice 
versa. According to Neisser, “recalling an experienced event is a matter not of reviving a 
single record but of moving appropriately among nested levels of structure”70. And in fact, 
empirical research done by Barsalou confirms that in free recall protocols, the memories of 
simple events are invoked together with other kinds of memories of events, like complex 
and general events (“I went on a diet”) and alternative events (“I had not taken a shower”), 
and even evaluative comments about aspects of the events (“We had a lovely apartment”).    
Whereas this second version of the content criterion avoids the problems of the first 
version, it presents some weakness as a criterion for distinguishing different kinds of 
memories. On the one hand, the distinction between different memories of personally 
experienced events according to the level of abstraction of events (from experience-near to 
highly abstract events) is not really conceived as a distinction per se but parallels the 
episodic/semantic distinction. Shortly after its reintroduction in the field, autobiographical 
 
66 CONWAY, Episodic memories. 
67 NEISSER, Nested structure in autobiographical memory. 
68 BARSALOU, The content and organization of autobiographical memories. 
69 CONWAY; PLEYDELL-PEARCE, The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory system. 
70 NEISSER, Nested structure in autobiographical memory, p. 71. 
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memory was considered as a synonym of episodic memory71. But very soon it was 
distinguished from episodic memory, without for that being defined and analyzed 
independently from episodic memory. Larsen72 conceived autobiographical memory as a 
subset of the episodic memory system, Rubin73 and Baddeley74 as a subsystem at the 
intersection of episodic memories and semantic memories, and Brewer75 and Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce76 as a superordinate system that includes both episodic memory and 
semantic facts about the self. However, this superposition or partial overlap between 
autobiographical memories, episodic memories and semantic memories is not really 
clarifying. For example, the conception that not all episodic memories are 
autobiographical memories leads us to the following paradox: episodic autobiographical 
memories would share a large set of properties with episodic non-autobiographical 
memories in order for both of them to be considered as part of the same memory kind, but 
at the same time, they would present a large set of different properties from those 
belonging to episodic non-autobiographical memories in order for them to be gathered 
together with semantic autobiographical memories in another memory kind (i.e., 
autobiographical memories). The same could be said for semantic autobiographical and 
non-autobiographical memories. What is more, it seems that what reunites episodic and 
semantic autobiographical memories and distinguishes from other episodic and semantic 
memories that are not autobiographical is not the nature of the event, but some implicit 
criterion related to the reference to the self (I will come back to this idea in the last 
section). 
On the other hand, considering that autobiographical memories of experience-near 
events equate to episodic memories whereas the rest of autobiographical memories 
constitute a subset of semantic memory77 does not provide a better solution with regard to 
the empirical data that shows the heterogeneous nature of autobiographical memories that 
are not near-experience. Even if it is granted that experience-near autobiographical 
memories have many properties in common (similar level of abstraction and generality, 
similar neural substrate, a high degree of sensory imagery, specific phenomenal feelings, 
etc78) and thus it makes sense to cluster them into the category of episodic memory, the 
same cannot be said of semantic autobiographical memories.  
 
71 TULVING, Elements of Episodic Memory. 
72 LARSEN, Personal context in autobiographical and narrative memories. 
73 RUBIN, The basic-systems model of episodic memory. 
74 BADDELEY, Reflections on autobiographical memory. 
75 BREWER, What is autobiographical memory? 
76 CONWAY; PLEYDELL-PEARCE, The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory system 
77 CONWAY, Memory and the self; Episodic memories. 
78 See for example RUBIN, Event memory: A theory of memory for laboratory, autobiographical and fictional 
events. 
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First, memories of repeated events include spatial and temporal information, that is, 
contextual information, sensory imagery and emotion79, similarly to episodic memory. 
Also, the brain areas activated during retrieval are more similar—even if they do not 
overlap—to episodic memory than to semantic memory: they include the hippocampus and 
the medial temporal lobe. The phenomenal feeling of re-experiencing is also generally 
present in memory of repeated events. 
Secondly, the nature of autobiographical facts, like “My son was born the 15th June 
1999” or “I used to live in Brown Street” is quite complex. Although some literature 
provide evidence of the similarity between autobiographical facts and semantic memory80, 
a recent review article about amnesic patients with medial temporal lobe lesion made by 
Grilli & Verfaellie81 comes to a different conclusion. According to this review, memory of 
autobiographical facts is impaired in amnesic patients, and this shows that memory of 
autobiographical facts partially depends on the medial temporal lobe and thus, that they 
share mechanisms with episodic memory. Also, Martinelli & al.82 state that semantic 
autobiographical memories seem to recruit basically the same brain structures as does 
episodic memory, but to a lesser extent and excluding the hippocampus. The problem is 
that notions like autobiographical facts and semantic autobiographical memories seem to 
refer to a variety of memories that includes friend’s names and personal addresses, 
memories that are closely associated with a unique event, such as “My son was born the 
15th June 1999”, and memories that refer to lifetime periods, such as “I used to live in 
Brown Street”. It is probable that memories of friend’s names and addresses are more 
semantic—because of their frequency—than other kinds of memories associated with 
events. It is also probably that memories associated with specific events would include 
more spatio-temporal information, sensory imagery and emotional content than memories 
associated with general events or lifetime periods. However, in real life memories the 
content is not always the same but fluctuates from the general to the specific and vice 
versa, so it is also probable that even memories of general events and lifetime periods can 
also be experienced with sensory imagery and some emotional content, with a consequent 
feeling of remembering. To someone’s question as to if I had always lived in the same 
house or not, I could simply reply “No, I used to live in Brown Street” and simultaneously a 
mental image of my house and the street could come to my mind as well as some feeling of 
nostalgia. 
There is also a third kind of autobiographical memories that are not experience-
near but present some similarities with episodic memories: autobiographically significant 
 
79 RENOULT et al., Personal semantics: at the crossroads of semantic and episodic memory. 
80 Idem. PICARD, et al., Functional independence within the self-memory system. 
81 GRILLI; VERFAELLIE, Personal semantic memory: Insights from neuropsychological research on amnesia. 
82 MARTINELLI et al., Neural substrates of the self-memory system. 
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concepts83, which refers to semantic concepts related to events (such as famous faces and 
names). This kind of memories seem to involve the medial temporal lobe and so engage 
both the episodic memory system and the semantic one. They are in general characterized 
by a high degree of sensory imagery and emotional content and include spatial and 
temporal information. Larsen84 also mentions a similar case to autobiographically 
significant concepts: narrative memories. Narrative memories are memories about events 
not directly experienced by the rememberer but learnt indirectly by testimony, such as 
events learnt by the news or read in a book or told by someone, whose content is thus not 
personal but, like autobiographically significant concepts, are nonetheless 
autobiographical because they have the property of being tied to a personal event. The 
personal context corresponds to the moment in which the rememberer received the 
message, news or information85, and this moment refers not only to the time and location 
but also can include personal meaning and have an emotional tone. It would be expected 
that narrative memories could be explained in a similar way to autobiographically 
significant concepts, astride the episodic memory and the semantic one. 
All these cases point to the fact that autobiographical memories that are not 
experience-near are very heterogeneous and cannot be clustered into the category of 
semantic autobiographical memories, in opposition to episodic autobiographical 
memories. Specific events, general events, repeated events, lifetime periods and other 
kinds of personal memories can be understood neither as similar to episodic memory nor 
as a sub-domain of semantic memory; nor even as a continuum that goes from the most 
specific and episodic elements to the most abstract and semantic ones, like most of the 
nested models of autobiographical memories propose. Furthermore, some evidence 
indicates that memories of experience-near events do not really belong to a homogenous 
category, and thus cannot always considered to be episodic. In fact, there are some 
memories of experience-near events that are poor in imagery and emotional tone, do not 
depend anymore upon the MDL (and thus upon the hippocampus), and present a large set 
of phenomenal properties that are different from those generally attributed to episodic 
memory. The reason is the process of semantization that affects some episodic memories 
due to remoteness and aging86.  
To conclude, this second version of the content criterion does not offer a good 
criterion to distinguish different kinds of memories neither. Similarities and differences 
between autobiographical memories of events cannot be explained according to the level 
 
83 RENOULT et al., Personal semantics: at the crossroads of semantic and episodic memory. 
84 LARSEN, Personal context in autobiographical and narrative memories. 
85 Idem, p. 61. The notion of narrative memory is very similar to the more recent and familiar notion of 
“flashbulb memory”. 
86 PIOLINO, et al. Episodic autobiographical memories over the course of time: cognitive, neuropsychological and 
neuroimaging findings. 
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of abstraction and generality of the event remembered. Although the level of abstraction of 
the content remembered may play some role at the moment of distinguishing different 
kinds of long-term individual memory representations, it does not provide by itself neither 
a sufficient criterion nor a significant one. It seems thus that the nature of memories are 
quite independent of the nature of the content that constitutes their intentional object, 
either when the content is defined in function of the absence or presence of temporal and 
contextual information, or in function of its level of abstraction and generalization. 
 
The phenomenal criterion 
 
Unlike the content criterion, which is focused on the properties of the intentional 
object of memories in order to distinguish different memory kinds, the phenomenal 
criterion establishes this distinction according to the particular phenomenology of 
memories. With time, the phenomenology of memory acquired more importance in 
Tulving’s memory model and thus memory kinds were redescribed in phenomenal terms: 
instead of being mainly defined in terms of the kind of information that is encoded, stored 
and retrieved, they were redefined in terms of the kind of subjective experience that 
accompanies the operations of the system at retrieval. McCormack87 called this new way of 
defining episodic memory the experiential description. This criterion proposes that the 
essential characteristic for identifying memory kinds is the type of conscious awareness 
that accompanies a memory experience. According to Tulving88, whereas the notion of 
autonoetic awareness characterizes episodic memory, semantic memory is characterized 
by the notion of noetic awareness. The concepts of noetic and autonoetic awareness, 
however, are not well defined. For example, Tulving describes autonoesis as referring “to 
the kind of consciousness awareness that characterizes conscious recollection of personal 
happenings”89. This description is a tautological definition; it does not say what 
characterizes the awareness of recollecting personally experienced events. In fact, Tulving 
added to autonoesis another three essential features of episodic memory which can give a 
clue about the meaning of this term: mental time travel, self and chronesthesia, all of 
which are highly related. Mental time travel refers to the possibility for the rememberer 
“to travel back in his or her mind to an earlier occasion or situation in the rememberer’s 
life, and to mentally relive the experienced and thought-about happenings”90. The self 
refers to the agent who does the travelling, and chronesthesia to the experience of 
subjective time that recollection allows. These characteristics summarize the meaning of 
the particular consciousness that accompanies recollection, and so autonoesis could be 
 
87 McCORMACK, Attributing episodic memory to animals and children. 
88 TULVING, Memory and consciousness. 
89 TULVING, Episodic memory and autonoesis: Uniquely human?, p. 15. 
90 Idem, p. 14. 
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defined as the awareness that arises from the ability to subjectively and mentally time 
travel to the past, which allows the self to represent and re-experience a past event. 
Therefore, essential to the notion of autonoesis is the idea of re-experiencing past 
experiences91. Because of these characteristics, it “confers the special phenomenal flavor to 
the remembering of past events, the flavor that distinguishes remembering from other 
kinds of awareness, such as those characterizing perceiving, thinking, imagining, or 
dreaming”92. Noesis, on the other side, only allows the rememberer to be aware of the 
content of the memory. When information about the personal past is remembered without 
any recollective experience, that is, with noetic awareness, it is strictly only known and 
corresponds to the semantic memory system. That is why this distinction between 
remembering a past experience in an autonoetic or a noetic manner corresponds to other 
famous distinction introduced by Tulving in the psychological field between remembering 
some event from the personal past and knowing some event from the (personal) past. 
Some amnesic patients would constitute empirical evidence for this dissociative 
hypothesis: those who have source amnesia and those with medial temporal lobe damage 
which principally affects the hippocampus. Source amnesia is described as the retention 
and retrieval of factual content of an episode without any recollection of the episode itself 
in which that factual content was acquired93. Patients with frontal lobe damage, elderly 
individuals and patients in early stages of Alzheimer’s disease are among the groups who 
have this sort of memory disorder, which was already remarked by Claparède94 in the study 
of his Korsakoff's patient. The same dissociation is presented in amnesic patients with 
damage to the hippocampus. It is of interest to consider patients whose hippocampus has 
been damaged early in life95, because it shows that they can attain average levels of speech, 
language competence, literacy and factual knowledge without being able to remember 
events in daily life and spatial and temporal locations. But probably the most important 
and paradigmatic case of loss of autonoetic consciousness without loss of noetic 
consciousness is the amnesic patient K.C.96 who had global anterograde amnesia and 
retrograde episodic amnesia. K.C.’s implicit and procedural memories were preserved. He 
still possessed stored semantic facts about the world and also about his life, and could still 
learn under special conditions some new facts. However, he was unable to recollect 
 
91 TULVING, Chronesthesia: awareness of subjective time, p. 313. 
92 TULVING, Memory and consciousness, p. 3. 
93 EVANS; THORN, Two types of posthypnotic amnesia: Recall amnesia and source amnesia; SCHACTER et al., 
Retrieval without recollection: An experimental analysis of source amnesia; WHEELER, Episodic memory and 
autonoetic awareness. 
94 CLAPAREDE, Recognition et moitié. 
95 VARGHA-KHADEM, et al. Differential effects of early hippocampal pathology on episodic and semantic 
memory. 
96 TULVING, Memory and consciousness 
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specific events in which he himself participated or that he witnessed, whether experienced 
long ago or in more recent times. In fact, the autobiographical knowledge about his past 
relied completely on his semantic memory: he showed no feeling of re-experiencing and 
his recollections completely lacked the subjective re-evoking of the emotional and 
contextual details that defined episodic memory97. Even episodes in K.C.'s life that are 
supposed to be personal tragedies are remembered as simple decontextualized facts, 
without any emotional tone, vividness or intensity. K.C. is not the only example and other 
similar cases have been reported in the literature98. 
More recently, the psychologist Stanley Klein99 has defended a similar position to 
Tulving’s experiential definition episodic memory. According to Klein, “a memory 
experience is not the nature of the content presented to awareness, but the manner in 
which awareness becomes associated with the content during the act of retrieval”100. 
Information about an event’s what, where and when, that is, about the temporal and 
spatial context of some happening, even if it is self-referential, can also be displayed in 
reports of semantic experience. Unlike Tulving’s SPI model, Klein considers that this 
information is unspecified prior to its demarcation as semantic or episodic during the act 
of retrieval. Two case studies are in favor of his account. The first one refers to amnesic 
patients similar to K.C., as well as developmental amnesic children, who are unable to re-
live their personal past, and thus remembering it in a proper way, but are nonetheless able 
to re-learn the temporal, spatial and self-referential information about their own past even 
if less detailed than non-amnesic people. The second case is a little more controversial, 
because it refers to a patient who had a temporary memory disorder due to an accident and 
was exclusively interviewed at that time by Klein. According to Klein & Nichols101, during 
some time after the accident this patient, who is known as R.B., was able to describe 
events of his life with contextually rich details but without the feeling of mine-ness that 
would be proper to autonoetic awareness: “when I recall memories of my past I 
intellectually know they are about me. It just does not feel like it ... when I remember 
scenes from before the injury they do not feel as if they happened to me –though 
intellectually I know they did”102.  
In conclusion, the criterion based on the phenomenology of the experience breaks 
the equation between episodic memory and memory of events. The retrieval of information 
about some experience-near past event does not need to be necessarily accompanied by 
 
97 ROSENBAUM, et al. The case of K.C.: Contributions of a memory-impaired person to memory theory, p. 
1008 
98 NADEL; MOSCOVITCH, Memory Consolidation, Retrograde Amnesia and the Hippocampal Complex, p. 219.  
99 KLEIN, The two selves: Their metaphysical commitments and functional independence; What memory is? 
100 Idem, p. 45.  
101 KLEIN; NICHOLS, Memory and the sense of personal identity.  
102 KLEIN, What memory is?, p. 47 
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autonoetic awareness; it can also come with noetic awareness. What is more, the memory 
distinction based on the phenomenology can account without problem what the second 
version of the content criterion could not: the process of semantization of memories of 
experience-near events due to remoteness and aging103.  
The phenomenal criterion presents other advantages in relation to the second 
version of the content criterion. In general terms, it avoids multiplying different memory 
systems and kinds and thus analyzing a single memory occurrence as belonging to or 
sharing properties with different memory systems (such as semantic autobiographical 
memories). It also avoids clustering under the same category: semantic autobiographical 
memory, all the memory of events that are not experience-near, which do not really belong 
to a homogenous class (as the empirical data concerning repeated events, autobiographical 
facts and autobiographical significant concepts have shown). Memories of events can be 
remembered autonoetically or noetically, and this is not completely determined by the 
level of abstraction and generality of the event remembered. That is why a memory of a 
repeated or general event can be remembered with autonoesis, and thus present more 
similarities with some memories of experience-near events than with other memories of 
events of a high level of abstraction. It is in fact the mode of retrieval which determines 
the kind of awareness that accompanies the memory retrieval. Finally, this criterion does 
not distinguish different kinds of memories of events, but different kinds of memories tout 
court. So it also accounts for memories of individuals, that is, of objects, people and places, 
which are not actually reducible to events and were in general excluded from most models 
of autobiographical memory. It explains thus why the memory of my partner who is 
currently absent from home, or of my dead father, can come with a subjective feeling of 
travelling back to the past. 
Nonetheless, the phenomenal criterion is not exempt of criticism. First, as I have 
already highlighted, the notions of autonoetic and noetic awareness are quite obscure. 
Since its introduction by Tulving, autonoesis has been considered by many researchers as 
synonym of reexperiencing and consciously reliving the past. Authors insist that in 
episodic memory the rememberer “view[s] these events as they would originally have been 
seen through her own eyes”104, and it “is for her just as if the scenario were present”105. 
Nonetheless, these characterizations are rather vague and imprecise to distinguish 
memory kinds. What is more, autonoesis, or the feeling of reliving and reexperiencing the 
past does not appear as an all-or-none phenomenon. Only traumatic memories related to 
PSTD are cases that truly deserved the qualifying “reexperience” and “reliving”: the 
intrusive visual memories that characterize PTSD convey a sense of immediate perceptual 
 
103 PIOLINO, et al. Episodic autobiographical memories over the course of time: cognitive, neuropsychological and 
neuroimaging findings. 
104 Idem, p. 2318.  
105 CHENG, et al. Dissociating memory traces and scenario construction in mental time travel, p. 15. 
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experience because they are processed as real and as a real threat106. Other cases of 
episodic memories do not imply a real feeling of reexpericing or reliving the past event. In 
fact, this variability of the sense of reliving a past experience is taken into consideration in 
different versions of the Autobiographical Memory Characteristics Questionnaire that 
demand the rememberers to address the vividness and the level of recollective experience 
of their memories using a seven-point Likert-type scale107. Therefore, autonoesis seems to 
be better conceived as a gradual phenomenal property of memories that can come in 
different degrees, and not as a particular mode of awareness among two possible and 
opposite modes.  
Secondly, although it is possible to conceive the phenomenal criterion as the key 
criterion to establish distinctions between memory kinds, it is not clear neither that 
Tulving and subsequent researchers conceived it independently of the content 
remembered (except probably only for Klein), nor that it is possible—and plausible—to 
conceive it that way. In one of Tulving’s writings, episodic memory “is defined in terms of 
criteria such as the system’s function—what the system does, how it works, the kind of 
‘information’ that it deals with, its relations to other systems, and its neural substrates”108, 
suggesting that the content of a memory plays some role in order to determine the memory 
kind to which this memory belongs. An episodic memory, that is, an experience 
remembered with autonoetic awareness, does not seem to be a memory of any kind of 
information.  
Rubin109, on the other hand, is less equivocal than Tulving: for him, memories that 
are highly correlated with a sense of reliving and other measures of reliving (such as 
mental time travel) are memories presented through a particular kind of vehicle: visual and 
spatial imagery. Whereas he does not explicitly correlate phenomenology and content but 
phenomenology and vehicles of representation, this explicit correlation carries in certain 
way an implicit correlation between content and phenomenology. The nature of visual and 
spatial imagery or “scenes”, as Rubin calls it, puts certain constraints on the kinds of 
intentional object that our memories may have. Because the construction of a unique scene 
resultant from a sort of superposition form the exposure to multiple perspectives of the 
same scene does not mainly differ from the superposition of repeated scenes implied in the 
construction of scenes of repeated events, Rubin considers that repeated events are similar 
to unique and simple events110. But the relation between scenes and more abstract and 
 
106 HOLMES; MATTHEWS, Mental imagery in emotion and emotional disorders. 
107 JOHNSON et al., Phenomenal characteristics of memories for perceived and imagined autobiographical events. 
BOYACIOGLU; AKFIRAT, Development and psychometric properties of a new measure for memory 
phenomenology: The autobiographical memory characteristics questionnaire. 
108 TULVING, Episodic memory and autonoesis: Uniquely human?, p. 10. 
109 RUBIN, Event memory: A theory of memory for laboratory, autobiographical and fictional events. 
110 Also RENOULT et al. Personal semantics: at the crossroads of semantic and episodic memory. 
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generic events is not so simple. In some cases it is possible to construct a sort of generic 
image that does not correspond to any single episodic moment, whereas in other cases a 
similar generic image is not possible:  
Generic personal memories are constrained by the abstracting properties of 
the relevant perceptual systems. Thus, I can have a generic personal 
memory of ‘going out on the beach’ during some vacation but not of ‘going 
on vacation’ where that includes going hiking in the mountains, going 
swimming at a beach, and visiting a major city111.  
So it seems that when our memories are directed to some general events, extendures 
and lifetime periods, the only imagery that can accompany these retrievals to give to them 
a sort of derivative recollective phenomenology are scenes of less general events that are 
subsumed under them or of things or people involved, that is, images of what can be 
representable through the corresponding perceptual systems. 
This correlation between phenomenology, content and vehicles of representation 
depends on the assumption that visual and spatial imagery is what gives a special kind of 
phenomenology to memories. Nonetheless, this assumption is not exempt of problems: 
scenes alone cannot account for the special phenomenology that is characteristic of some 
memories because, as it was explained as part of the criticism to the vehicle criterion, 
memories of specific events can be devoid of visual and spatial imagery; scenes can also be 
part of memories with noetic awareness, and visual and spatial imagery are also part of the 
construction of different kinds of non-mnemonic mental states. 
On the other hand, there is certainly some correlation between the phenomenology, 
content and means of representation of memories. Nonetheless, these possible 
correlations have been for now more sketched that studied in deep, and in fact seem 
difficult to define. Rubin’s proposal of a relation between vehicles of representation and 
memory contents conceived according to its level of abstraction and generalization present 
some limitations. Although Tulving112 himself implied that there were multiple properties 
that establish a difference between episodic and semantic memory, he did not explicitly 
explain how these properties interrelate with each other in order to determine the ones 
that are essential and the ones that are secondary. His later emphasis on the major 
importance of the phenomenal property to define memory kinds (autonoesis versus noesis), 
does not seem to be completely convincing. 
 
A promising line for future research: the affective criterion 
 
 
111 BREWER, What is autobiographical memory?, p. 30. 
112 TULVING, Elements of Episodic Memory. Episodic memory and common sense: how far apart?   
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This analysis shows that for now, none of the criteria proposed in the literature to 
distinguish memory kinds is completely satisfactory. Some criteria should be directly 
discarded, such as the grammatical and causal criteria, because they do not provide any 
credible hint of the memory properties that may be the cause of different natural kinds. 
Some other criteria seem more promising, but neither as they were formulated nor isolated 
from one another. The last remarks done in the former section suggest that a kind of 
correlation between the vehicle of representation, the content and the phenomenology 
may be better suited to account for the varied nature of our memories. This interrelation, 
which is probably not easy to characterize, needs certainly to be object of a detailed and 
deep research. It is not the aim of this article to provide such an explanation: its main 
purpose is to expound the different criteria proposed to distinguished memory kinds and 
highlight their problems and challenges. Nonetheless, the rest of this section mentions 
briefly a hypothesis that may be worth exploring. 
Many authors, especially coming from philosophy, have stated that what really 
characterizes episodic memories and distinguishes them from semantic ones is the 
presence of the past self in the representation of the experience remembered. Whereas in 
episodic memory, the events represented are presented as having happened in the past to 
me, in semantic memory, on the contrary, those events do not present any reference to the 
self. This reference to the self has been in some cases tied to the notion of autonoesis: 
autonoetic awareness is not only awareness directed to something past, but also directed 
to onself, more specifically, to the past self who was the subject of the past experience. For 
example, Chen & al. have explicitly defined autonoesis as “the awareness that oneself has 
been part of the recalled event”113; also Bermudez114 has stated that episodic memory 
involves an awareness that the event happened to me, to give some examples. This self-
reference can be accounted by two means. Either the self is directly present on the memory 
content (for example, through the integration of a memory or conceptual knowledge of my 
past self into the construction of the memory of a past experience), or is part of the process 
of retrieval (option that would be more compatible with memory processes than with 
memory systems). Rowlands115 has recently proposed this last conception: the act of 
remembering—which can be understood as the process of remembering—subsumes the 
event remembered under a specific mode of presentation that, as a result, entails a change 
in the way the event is remembered. Because of this mode, the past event is presented “as 
one that has been formerly witnessed, orchestrated or otherwise encountered by the 
rememberer”116, that is, in intrinsic connection to the past self.  
 
113 CHENG, et al. Dissociating memory traces and scenario construction in mental time travel, p. 4. 
114 BERMUDEZ, Memory and Self-consciousness. 
115 ROWLANDS, Memory and the self: Phenomenology, science and autobiography. 
116 Idem, p. 49. 
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Whereas the line of research that proposes the presence or the absence of the self as 
a criterion to distinguish different memory kinds is quite promising, it needs further 
development in order to avoid a similar criticism to the previously mentioned, such as the 
semantization process suffered by some episodic memories due to remoteness and aging. 
One possible way of refining this idea and avoid this possible criticism, consists in 
exploring a more elaborated and precise way in which the self can be present or not in our 
memories: through affect. Affect is essentially relational, that is, is the product of the 
relation between the individual and her environment, and thus represents how an 
individual is moved and influenced in terms of harms, benefits, morality or self-image by 
the dynamic and continuous environmental changes. While some of our memories seem to 
be directed towards objective and impersonal properties of past events and experiences, 
others represent not the past experience or event in itself, independently of the 
rememberer, but the way in which the rememberer was affected by that past experience or 
event. The focus of this last kind of memories is the affective significance of a past 
experience, and not its descriptive impersonal properties. This affection can be explicitly 
attended to as the intentional object of the memory, or can appear in a pre-attentive or 
pre-reflective way; it can take the form of interoceptive bodily sensations, action 
tendencies, and even motor behaviors. The interplay between a special type of memory 
content: affect, carried by specific vehicles of representation: bodily sensations, action 
tendencies, etc., and being susceptible of different levels of consciousness (reflectivity, pre-
reflectivity, etc.), would determine the particular phenomenal properties of the memory. 
According to this proposal, our everyday memories are situated somewhere between two 
extremes: either we remember events and experiences objectively, completely detached 
from the rememberer, or we remember them through their past affection, and it is through 
this affection that the rememberer is present in the content of memory. Close to the first 
extreme, there are memories of past events that contain a minimal reference to the self: 
events are presented as formerly witnessed, orchestrated or encountered by the 
rememberer, so the presence of the self in the memory content is reduced to a simple past 
spectator or orchestrator. At the end of the opposite extreme, there are those “affective” 
memories that imply a real emotional reexperience of the past event, such as in PTSD. 
Because of the varied way in which affection can be represented and consciously attended 
to, our affective memories would occupy different points in this continuum, and entail 
different phenomenal properties, or similar phenomenal properties but in different 
degrees. In fact, this conceptual outline could be matched with relatively recent attempts 
to integrate the amygdala to the standard model of episodic memory in order to account 
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for the emotional properties and significance of the events remembered through the 
episodic memory system117. 
More research should be pursued in this line, because the presence of the self 
through affection appears at first sight as an excellent starting-point in order to identify 
the possible interrelations between key components that account for the existence of 
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